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Abstract
What leads the United Nations Security Council to intervene in one conflict, but remain
inactive in others of similar magnitude and cruelty? This paper analyzes all registered 178
internal and internationalized internal conflicts since 1945, with the goal to unveil what deter-
mines the probability of a UN intervention. Our main focus lies on the question whether the
geographical proximity to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China,
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) has an effect on the probability
of intervention. Our results suggest that the UN is substantially more likely to intervene in
conflicts located in Europe. A more detailed look at distances revels that for every 1,000
kilometers of distance from France or the United Kingdom the probability of intervention
decreases by about one third. Further, we find that UN intervention is significantly more
likely to happen in smaller (less population), poorer (smaller GDP per capita), and less open
economies (openness to international trade).
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The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its
members. Harry S. Truman
1 Introduction
The United Nations name as one of their four main purposes “To keep peace throughout the
world.” The following pages focus particularly on the second portion of this statement – through-
out the world. Many times one comes to wonder what determines whether the UN intervenes
in one conflict, yet remains inactive in another conflict of similar magnitude and cruelty. This
paper narrows down determinants of UN intervention by analyzing all registered 178 internal
and internationalized internal conflicts between 1945 and 2011, with a specific focus on geo-
graphical aspects. Among these conflicts, the United Nations intervened in 27. Were we to look
at a crude measurement for the severity of all 178 conflicts, we find that 93 are marked by at
least 1,000 battle-related deaths. However, the pure correlation between conflict intensity and
intervention is remarkably low (under 0.15). Thus, the pressing question remains as to how
the United Nations Security Council makes his decision whether to intervene or not. Our main
focus lies not only on finding general information regarding intervention determinants, but also
on the question whether regional preferences could play any role here. Specifically, we look at
the geographical distance to each of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.
The general literature studying the determinants of third-party interventions has established
various interesting claims. For instance, Butler (2003) concludes that “...considerations of jus-
tice may have driven U.S. decisions to employ military force in international crisis.” Mullenbach
and Matthews (2008) on the other hand point out the difference between domestic and interna-
tional factors, which might influence a U.S. decision to intervene.1 In their findings, ideological
linkage and geographical proximity come out as dominant forces. The latter argument will be of
specific interest in the following pages. While geographical proximity may be an understandable
determinant for intervention by a specific country (like the U.S.), any regional considerations
should play no role whatsoever for a decision by the United Nations Security Council.
Specific to the United Nations, Diehl et al. (1996) examines the short- and long-term success
1Mullenbach (2005) comes to similar conclusions for third-party peacekeeping missions in general.
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of UN interventions, whereas Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) or Smith and Smith (2011) focus
on the – sometimes unintended – consequences from UN interventions. Further, Lebovic (2004)
focuses on the nations participating in an intervention and their democracy level. We want to be
clear in mentioning that we are neither modelling the determinants of conflict nor the outcome
of UN interventions.
The focus of our paper lies in the connection between two ideas prevalent in the respective
literatures. First, Neack (1995) has hinted that states might participate in UN interventions
predominantly for selfish reasons, as opposed to idealist considerations. Second, geographic
proximity has been suggested as a determinant for foreign military intervention, both in general
(Pearson, 1974) and in the context of the United States (Mullenbach and Matthews, 2008).
We see the main contribution of this paper in finding out whether the respective conflict’s
geographical distance from each of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council
could play any role in determining the probability of intervention. The implied selfish reasons
come as fairly intuitive: with a conflict close to domestic borders, a nation might have strong
interests in containing and suppressing any sources of trouble. Not only could the conflict spill
over to closer countries or even to the own country, it is also substantially more likely that
the domestic nation has intensive political and economic relationships with countries in their
proximity. This argument follows naturally from the gravity equation in international trade and
the first law of geography that “Everything is correlated with everything else, but close things
are more correlated than things that are far away.” (Tobler, 1970). Thus, countries could have
a stronger interest to intervene in conflicts closer to home, rather than in conflict zones at the
other end of the world. Yet regional considerations should not play any role in determining UN
intervention, according to the UN charter.
However, our results suggest that the probability of UN intervention increases substantially
if the conflict is located in Europe. More specifically, we find that for every 1,000 kilometers of
distance from France or the United Kingdom the probability of intervention decreases by about
33 percent. This result remains remarkably stable in several robustness checks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 describes our sample of conflicts,
whereas section 3 discusses our empirical methodology. Section 4 provides an overview of our
data and section 5 presents our main results. Finally, section 6 concludes.
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2 Conflicts
Since the foundation of the United Nations in 1945, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)
counts 178 conflicts (excluding extrasystemic armed conflicts between a state and a non-state
group outside its own territory).2 The UN Security Council intervened in 27 of these in one
or several of the following ways: (i) military intervention for peacebuilding, (ii) military inter-
vention for peacekeeping, or (iii) sanctions or embargos. The UN defines a fourth method of
intervention as calling for or demanding ceasing hostilities or establishment of observer mission.
However, given the low commitment associated with this kind of intervention – both in financial
and political terms – we decide to categorize these cases as non-intervention.
Table 1 provides a list of all 178 conflicts, indicating whether the UN did intervene – according
to our above definition– or not.3 A first glance at this list tells us that the overwhelming majority
of conflicts in the second part of the 20th century occurred on the African and Asian continents.
Even though Asian countries were subject to more conflicts (73) than African nations (65),
the UN intervened substantially more in Africa – 20 times versus 3 in Asia. Finally, the UN
only intervened once on an American continent, namely in Haiti around the 1990s, when “...a
military faction led by Raoul Ce´dras managed to oust the government of popularly elected
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.” (UCDP website)
3 Methodology
Our variable of interest is whether the United Nations intervenes or not. Although one could
specify the level of intervention further (e.g. financial or military commitments by the participat-
ing nations), it is difficult to disentangle and measure the exact level of involvement, especially
considering the different time frames and circumstances under which these decisions have taken
place. Thus, we model the UN decision as a binary outcome of intervention or not, in line with
our categorization of intervention above.
We choose a logistic regression method as our econometric tool. Although there are only
2Including extrasystemic armed conflicts between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory did
not change the general implications of our results.
3Notice that there are several double entries of the same country and year, which occurs if a country incurs
various conflicts within a year.
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very subtle differences to a probit approach for example, we prefer the logistic model mainly
because of the intuitive interpretation of the coefficients. The resulting odds ratios allow us to
express the effect of a change in any independent variable on the probability of UN intervention.
Specifically, our main model becomes
logit(p)i = α0 + α1Intensityi + α2Africa+ α3Asia+ α4Europe+ α5Xi,t + α6Zi + i,t, (1)
where pi is the overall probability of intervention by the United Nations Security Council in
conflict i (with i ∈ {0, N} for N overall conflicts). Intensity describes the severeness of the
respective conflict, whereas continental dummies (Africa, Asia, and Europe) capture where
the host country of the conflict is located.4
Further, Xi,t contains several control variables, describing the main macroeconomic and po-
litical characteristics of the respective conflict country: (i) population size, (ii) GDP per capita,
(iii) openness to trade, and (iv) the Polity IV variable measuring the degree of democratization
in the conflict nation. All of these are measured at the starting year of the respective conflict,
indicated by the subscript t. Regarding population size, one could think of two intuitions why
the UN might intervene: first, a bigger society means that the potential human loss could be
greater; second, the more people you have, the more potential soldiers there are. The first argu-
ment promotes a positive relationship between population size and probability of intervention,
whereas the latter argument could motivate either relationship. For instance, a negative effect
could be caused by the cost of intervention increasing with more soldiers being involved.5 These
intuitions are also closely related to income per capita, as the opportunity cost of joining an
army could naturally be lower when income is low in the first place. For a good review on the
economic causes of civil war, one might consider the work of Paul Collier in general and Collier
and Hoeﬄer (1998) specifically. Another reason for the importance of basic macroeconomic
factors in this context is the fact that the UN may have a paternalistic view in trying to defend
people that otherwise are not able to defend themselves. This philosophy is currently being
4There have been too few conflicts in Oceania and only one intervention on the American continents, thus
making the inclusion of those continental dummies obsolete.
5For a general intuition of the relationship between conflict and the size of countries, one might consult Alesina
and Spolaore (2005).
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underlined by the UN initiative “responsibility to protect” (R2P). This is reinforced by the fact
that UN members have accepted the declaration of human rights and international humanitarian
conventions.6
In addition, Zi,t captures the geographical aspect of our analysis. First, Zi,t contains basic
location features, namely dummies for continents and whether the country is landlocked or an
island. Further, one of the main components of our analysis is the distance of the respective
conflict nation to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. In
theory, these geographical distances should not make any difference in the decision to intervene,
yet it has often been argued (albeit mostly in newspapers and anecdotal discussions) that those
decisions may carry a geographical component. We see this analysis of the geographical aspect
as the main contribution of our paper – first, by the inclusion of basic continental dummies
and second, more specifically, by the inclusion of the geographical proximity to China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Finally, i,t constitutes the usual error
term.
4 Data
4.1 Basic Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of all variables used in our analysis. Our binary dependent
variable interv – whether the UN intervenes in a conflict area or not – comes directly from the
UN Security Council’s resolutions and is equal to one if the UN intervened according to our
above categorization. The first and potentially most intuitive independent variable predicting an
intervention is the intensity of the conflict (intensity). We would expect that as the intensity of
the conflict increases, so does the probability of intervention. The UCDP allows us to categorize
the severity of the conflict into “between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths” and conflicts with
more than 1,000 battle-related deaths.
Further, we use the Penn World Table version 7.1 for main macroeconomic features of the
countries, such as population size, GDP percapita, and openness to trade, each taken at the first
6For a recent contribution towards the connection between regional trade agreements and conflicts, one might
consider Martin et al. (2012).
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year of the respective conflict (lnpop, lngdp, and lnopen). In our main specifications, we employ
the natural logarithm of each of these, to achieve better comparability of results, although not
using logs does not change our general conclusions.
To capture the level of democracy, we incorporate the Polity IV index (polityIV ), in par-
ticular the variable polity2, ranging from −10 (totally autocratic) to +10 (total democracy).
Moving to the main focus of our paper, we include continental dummies and eventually the
shortest distance of the respective conflict country to each of the five permanent members of the
UN: the Untied Kingdom (ukdist), France (fradist), China (chidist), Russia (rusdist), and the
United States (usdist). In addition, we add dummies for a country being landlocked or being
an island.
4.2 Summary Statistics of Conflicts
Table 3 displays a variety of characteristics, comparing conflicts where the UN intervened to
conflicts where the UN did not intervene and to general worldwide averages. This descriptive
table provides both a basic understanding of the differences between intervention and non-
intervention cases (column 2 versus column 3), but also an idea of what distinguishes the host
nation of a conflict from the rest of the world (columns 2 and 3 versus column 4). Starting with
the latter comparison, a few features are standing out: conflict countries are (i) substantially
poorer than the world average in terms of GDP per capita and (ii) less open to international
trade. The fact that the group of conflict countries is both larger in terms of population (on
average 85 million people, as opposed to 22.8 million as a world average) and less open to
international trade is in line with previous findings. Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) argue that
larger economies are generally less open to trade, simply because they are able to rely on a
bigger domestic market.
Focusing on the conflict nations, we note some remarkable difference between cases of UN
intervention and non-intervention. First, intervention is very unlikely to occur in highly popu-
lated countries, as the average country size for intervention cases is 7.2 million people, compared
to 101.4 million people in non-intervention cases. This difference is astonishing. Second, mean
income per capita is twice the size in non-intervention countries, suggesting that the UN is more
likely to intervene in the poorest nations, with an average of only US$ 1,850 in 2005 constant
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prices (PPP adjusted). In addition, the UN appears to be more likely to intervene in less demo-
cratic (and more autocratic) nations, as suggested by the polity IV index. Finally, we notice
some interesting regional differences: probability of UN intervention seems to rise in countries
that happen to be further away from France (3,650 kilometers on average versus 5,050 kilometers
in non-intervention cases) or located in Europe in general. Further, intervention seems to be
more likely in Africa, but less likely in Asia or countries close to China. Finally, distance to the
United States does not seem to make any difference.
Although these basic descriptive statistics give us some idea about the characteristics of
conflicts and intervention cases, one needs to be careful not to read too much into them. The
following regression analysis will provide more insight into what remains as determining factors
of UN intervention.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 The Continent of Conflict
Tables 4 – 6 show our main results from logistic regressions. In all tables, we display six
regressions with the odds ratio of the respective variables and the standard errors below in
parentheses. The intuition of odds ratio suggests that any values bigger than 1 increase the
odds of intervention, whereas a value below 1 stands for a decrease in the probability of the UN
intervening. In each table, we add regressors moving from left to right, predicting the probability
of UN intervention.
We first focus on the location of the respective conflicts by introducing continental dummies
in table 4. Although African conflicts seem to increase the odds of intervention at first, this
impression quickly fades when adding macroeconomic country features, such as population size
or GDP per capita and openness to trade. Further including the Polity IV index and regional
specifics in column (5) pushes the odds ratio under 1, indicating that being in Africa actually
decreases the probability of intervention. However, this result is not significant. The results for
Europe on the other hand are stronger. Throughout all six regressions, the European dummy
is significant on conventional levels, with the odds ratio staying well above 1. This indicates
that European countries have a bigger probability of UN intervention than the rest of the world.
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The suggested magnitude of this effect is stunning: in our final specification with all our control
variables included, intervention is 16 times more likely in European countries compared to the
rest of the world.
The remaining regressors mostly confirm our initial suspicion from looking at plain summary
statistics in table 3. Higher intensity of the conflict increases the probability of intervention by a
factor of 7.3 in the final specification. Further, the UN is significantly less likely to intervene in
(i) bigger countries, (ii) richer countries, and (iii) countries which are more open to international
trade. Surprisingly, the level of democracy in the conflict country does not seem to play any
decisive role for an intervention decision; neither do general geographical features such as whether
the country is landlocked or an island. Finally, the coefficient on year is above 1 and significant,
indicating that the UN was more likely to intervene in recent conflicts. Every year increases
the odds of intervention by 11 percent. We find it also noteworthy to mention that a dummy
variable for conflicts during the Cold War (before 1991) neither affects the significance levels
nor the magnitude of our results (not displayed here, but available upon request).
In summary, these results suggest that the probability of intervention strongly increase if
a conflict takes place in Europe. Note that these results do not imply a negative bias against
African or Asian countries, but rather a positive bias in favor of intervention in European con-
flicts. However, if we look at the summary of conflicts in table 1, we note that UN intervention
in Europe exclusively took place throughout the wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s (inter-
ventions three times in Bosnia and Herzegovina, twice in Serbia, and once in Croatia). If we
were to broadly consider the Yugoslavian wars as one major conflict zone, then our results with
respect to European conflicts may be driven by this one big conflict only. Thus, we now move
to a more sophisticated measurement of the geography of conflicts by considering the geograph-
ical proximity of the conflict nation to each of the five permanent members in the UN Security
Council.
5.2 The Conflict’s Geographical Distance to the UN
As a more detailed measurement of geographical proximity relative to the five permanent mem-
bers of the UN Security Council, we now move to the inclusion of distances in kilometers. First,
we consider the distance to the United Kingdom, measured in 1,000 kilometers, in table 5. Again
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adding control variables from left to right, we note that the odds ratio on ukdist remains be-
low 1 and statistically meaningful. This suggests that a larger geographical distance to Britain
significantly decreases the probability of intervention, leaving the remaining control variables
unchanged. In terms of magnitude, the final specification including all available control vari-
ables concludes that every 1,000 kilometers of distance from the UK decreases the probability
of intervention by about 30 percent. Regarding the other regressors, the results are mostly in
line with the ones from table 4.
Moving to another permanent member of the UN Security Council, we now consider the
geographical proximity to France in table 6. We find similar results to the previous findings, as
the distance to France remains significant throughout all specifications. Once again, every 1,000
kilometers of distance lowers the probability of intervention by about 30 percent. However, given
the strong correlation between distances to Britain and France, these results mostly serve as a
confirmation of the findings in table 5.
We now turn to the other permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, Russia,
and the United States. Table 7 replicates specifications (2) and (6) from table 6, this time
including the distances from China, Russia, and the United States. However, we do not find
the strong results from the previous tables, neither in terms of significance nor in magnitude:
distance to either China, Russia, or the U.S. does not seem to play any role in determining the
probability of UN intervention. This is specifically interesting in the context of the United States
with their strong involvement in many conflict areas worldwide. One explanation could be that
the U.S. tends to pursue their interventions in a more direct way, thus not always looking for the
United Nations as the primary organization of intervention. These claims are highly speculative
of course and should provide further avenues for future research.
6 Conclusions
This paper pursues two main objectives. First, we wish to shed light on what determines
interventions by the United Nations Security Council in general. Second, we analyze whether
the geographical proximity to any of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council
play any role in determining the probability of intervention. Given the United Nations’ goal “To
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keep peace throughout the world,” the decision to intervene, both militarily (peacebuilding and
peacekeeping) and by sanctions, should theoretically not be affected by geographical location.
However, our results suggest that the larger the geographical distance to France or the United
Kingdom, the lower the probability of UN intervention. Specifically, for every 1,000 kilometers
of distance, the probability of intervention seems to decrease by 30 percent, everything else
equal. Interestingly, we do not find any significant results for distances to the other three
permanent members (China, Russia, and the United States). Thus, the traditional big European
political powers appear to have a strong political influence in the UN’s decisions about conflict
intervention.
In addition to our geographical results, we also find that the UN is significantly more likely to
intervene in (i) less populated countries, (ii) the poorest nations, and (iii) countries, which are
less open to international trade. We leave it up to the reader to draw any potential conclusions
from these findings.
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Table 1: Conflicts since 1945
Country Year UN intervention Country Year UN intervention
Africa Africa cont.
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1960 Senegal 1988
Cameroon 1960 Comoros 1989
Ethiopia 1960 Mali 1990
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1960 Yes Algeria 1990
Ethiopia 1961 Rwanda 1990 Yes
Sudan 1963 Ethiopia 1991
Ethiopia 1964 Sierra Leone 1991 Yes
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1964 Yes Niger 1991
Gabon 1964 Djibouti 1991
Burundi 1965 Yes Angola 1991
Chad 1966 Yes Eritrea 1993
Nigeria 1966 Congo, Rep. 1993
Ghana 1966 Niger 1994
South Africa 1966 Niger 1995
Zimbabwe 1966 Yes Comoros 1997
Cambodia 1967 Yes Lesotho 1998
Nigeria 1967 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1998
Morocco 1971 Guinea-Bissau 1998 Yes
Uganda 1971 Guinea 2000
Madagascar 1971 Central African Republic 2001 Yes
Sudan 1971 Yes Cote d’Ivoire 2002 Yes
Ethiopia 1974 Nigeria 2003
Ethiopia 1975 Nigeria 2004
Mauritania 1975 Mauritania 2008
Angola 1975 Yes Sudan 2011
Morocco 1975 Sudan 2011 Yes
Mozambique 1977 Libya 2011 Yes
Ethiopia 1977
South Africa 1978 Asia
Tunisia 1980
Liberia 1980 Yes Russian Federation 1945
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1981 Iran, Islamic Rep. 1945
Gambia, The 1981 Russian Federation 1946
Kenya 1982 China 1946
Somalia 1982 Yes Philippines 1946
Ethiopia 1982 Iran, Islamic Rep. 1946
Togo 1986 China 1947
Burkina Faso 1987 Myanmar 1948
Senegal 1988 Myanmar 1948
Comoros 1989 Myanmar 1948
Mali 1990 Israel 1948
Algeria 1990 Myanmar 1948
Rwanda 1990 Yes India 1948
Ethiopia 1991 Myanmar 1949
Sierra Leone 1991 Yes China 1950
Niger 1991 Indonesia 1950
Djibouti 1991 Thailand 1951
Angola 1991 Indonesia 1953
Eritrea 1993 India 1955
Congo, Rep. 1993 Vietnam 1955
Niger 1994 Malaysia 1957
Niger 1995 Myanmar 1957
Comoros 1997 Oman 1957
Lesotho 1998 Iraq 1958
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1998 Lebanon 1958 Yes
Guinea-Bissau 1998 Yes Lao PDR 1959
Guinea 2000 Myanmar 1959
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Table 1 cont. Conflicts since 1945
Country Year UN intervention Country Year UN intervention
Asia cont. Europe
Nepal 1960 Yes Greece 1946
Iraq 1961 France 1961
Malaysia 1963 Spain 1968
Thailand 1965 United Kingdom 1970
Indonesia 1965 Romania 1989
India 1966 Georgia 1991
Syrian Arab Republic 1966 Azerbaijan 1991
Oman 1968 Georgia 1991
Philippines 1970 Serbia 1991 Yes
Pakistan 1971 Moldova 1991
Sri Lanka 1971 Serbia 1991
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1972 Croatia 1992 Yes
Pakistan 1973 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 Yes
Myanmar 1973 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 Yes
Bangladesh 1975 Georgia 1992
Indonesia 1975 Azerbaijan 1993
Sri Lanka 1975 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993 Yes
Afghanistan 1978 Yes Serbia 1996 Yes
India 1979 Macedonia, FYR 2000
Saudi Arabia 1979
India 1979 North America
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1979
India 1981 Cuba 1953
India 1983 Dominican Republic 1965
Turkey 1983 Haiti 1989 Yes
India 1984 Panama 1989
Israel 1986 Trinidad and Tobago 1990
Turkey 1987 Mexico 1994
India 1989 United States 2001
Indonesia 1989
Russian Federation 1990 Latin America
Russian Federation 1990
Pakistan 1990 Bolivia 1946
Tajikistan 1992 Paraguay 1947
Tajikistan 1992 Costa Rica 1948
Russian Federation 1993 Guatemala 1949
India 1993 Argentina 1955
Yemen, Rep. 1994 Venezuela, RB 1962
Russian Federation 1994 Colombia 1964
Myanmar 1997 Peru 1965
Russian Federation 1999 Uruguay 1970
Uzbekistan 1999 El Salvador 1972
India 2004 Chile 1973
India 2005 Nicaragua 1974
Russian Federation 2007 Suriname 1986
Myanmar 2009
Oceania
Papua New Guinea 1989
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N Source Description
interv 0.15 (0.36) 178 UN Dummy = 1 if economic sanctions
or arms embargo, peacekeeping op-
erations, and/or military interven-
tion (peacebuilding); = 0 otherwise
intensity 0.51 (0.50) 178 UCDP 0 if between 25 and 999 battle-
related deaths; 1 if at least 1,000
battle-related deaths
lnpop 16.57 (1.79) 151 PWT ln(population); variable POP
lngdp 7.49 (1.07) 130 PWT ln[PPP Converted GDP Per
Capita (Laspeyres) at 2005 con-
stant prices]; variable rgdpl
lnopen 3.65 (0.75) 130 PWT ln(Openness at 2005 constant prices
in %); variable openk
polityIV -0.49 (6.45) 168 Polity IV level of democracy, ranging from -
10 (totally autocratic) to +10 (total
democracy); variable polity2
ukdist 5.37 (2.70) 178 own distance to the United Kingdom in
thousand kilometers
fradist 4.84 (2.82) 178 own distance to France in thousand
kilometers
chidist 4.36 (4.03) 178 own distance to China in thousand
kilometers
rusdist 3.48 (2.87) 178 own distance to Russia in thousand
kilometers
usdist 8.02 (3.05) 178 own distance to the United States in
thousand kilometers
africa 0.37 (0.48) 178 own Dummy = 1 if country in Africa
asia 0.41 (0.49) 178 own Dummy = 1 if country in Asia
europe 0.11 (0.31) 178 own Dummy = 1 if country in Europe
namerica 0.04 (0.19) 178 own Dummy = 1 if country in North
America
oceania 0.01 (0.07) 178 own Dummy = 1 if country in Oceania
smamerica 0.07 (0.26) 178 own Dummy = 1 if country in Latin
America
landlocked 0.20 (0.40) 178 Dummy = 1 if country is landlocked
island 0.10 (0.30) 178 Dummy = 1 if country is an island
Notes: UCDP and PWT stand for Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Penn World Table Version 7.1,
respectively. UN represents the UN Security Council resolutions.
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Table 3: Comparing UN intervention cases to non-intervention cases and to worldwide averages
Interventions Non-interventions World Average 1960 – 2010
Variable Mean Mean Mean
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
N N N
Intensity 0.70 0.48
(0.47) (0.50)
N = 27 N = 151
Population in thousands 7,262 101,407 22,849
(5,144) (221,390) (91,611)
N = 25 N = 126 N = 11, 284
GDP per capita 1,850 3,668 8,578
(2,519) (5,101) (11,097)
N = 23 N = 107 N = 8, 664
Trade Openness (% of GDP) 47.34 50.23 69.20
(32.97) (37.88) (46.89)
N = 23 N = 107 N = 8, 664
PolityIV -3.73 -0.01 0.49
(4.21) (6.59) (7.49)
N = 22 N = 146 N = 7, 947
Distance from the UK in 1, 000 km 4.37 5.55 5.46
(2.25) (2.74) 2.77
N = 27 N = 151 N = 6, 676
Distance from France in 1, 000 km 3.65 5.05 4.95
(2.27) (2.86) (2.94)
N = 27 N = 151 N = 6, 676
Distance from China in 1, 000 km 5.29 4.19 6.11
(2.74) (4.20) (4.33)
N = 27 N = 151 N = 6, 676
Distance from Russia in 1, 000 km 3.55 3.46 4.47
(2.18) (2.98) (3.32)
N = 27 N = 151 N = 6, 676
Distance from the US in 1, 000 km 8.02 8.02 7.15
(2.37) (3.16) (3.36)
N = 27 N = 151 N = 6, 676
Africa 0.63 0.32 0.29
(0.49) (0.47) (0.45)
N = 27 N = 151 N = 11, 727
Asia 0.11 0.46 0.24
(0.32) (0.50) (0.42)
N = 27 N = 151 N = 11, 727
Europe 0.22 0.09 0.23
(0.42) (0.28) (0.42)
N = 27 N = 151 N = 11, 727
North America 0.04 0.04 0.10
(0.19) (0.20) (0.30)
N = 27 N = 151 N = 11, 727
Oceania 0 0.01 0.05
(0.00) (0.08) (0.22)
N = 27 N = 151 N = 11, 727
Latin America 0 0.09 0.10
(0.00) (0.28) (0.30)
N = 27 N = 151 N = 11, 727
Notes: World averages are derived from the PWT 7.1 version.
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Table 4: Basic results and differences across continents. Displaying odds ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
interv interv interv interv interv interv
africa 7.083∗ 8.799∗∗ 6.076 0.965 0.609 0.709
(7.529) (9.493) (6.723) (1.324) (0.874) (1.056)
asia 0.857 0.793 1.391 0.698 0.701 0.487
(1.013) (0.945) (1.722) (1.083) (1.104) (0.821)
europe 9.231∗ 11.05∗∗ 10.87∗∗ 49.36∗∗∗ 24.93∗∗ 16.10∗
(10.50) (12.82) (13.01) (67.24) (37.87) (25.95)
intensity 3.951∗∗∗ 6.026∗∗∗ 5.141∗∗ 2.655 7.388∗∗
(1.927) (3.398) (3.408) (1.938) (7.013)
lnpop 0.557∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.110) (0.117) (0.125)
lngdp 0.280∗∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.366∗
(0.144) (0.153) (0.217)
lnopen 0.356∗∗ 0.345∗∗ 0.0981∗∗
(0.173) (0.172) (0.0954)
polityIV 0.948 0.893
(0.0623) (0.0696)
landlocked 0.627 0.673
(0.477) (0.508)
island 0.267 0.102
(0.378) (0.181)
year 1.112∗∗
(0.0567)
N 178 178 151 130 125 125
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Basic results, including the geographical distance from the United Kingdom. Display-
ing odds ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
interv interv interv interv interv interv
ukdist 0.839∗∗ 0.821∗∗ 0.833∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗ 0.691∗
(0.0714) (0.0705) (0.0824) (0.101) (0.121) (0.140)
intensity 2.959∗∗ 5.218∗∗∗ 4.696∗∗ 2.937∗ 6.641∗∗
(1.366) (2.835) (2.871) (1.907) (5.314)
lnpop 0.527∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.0996) (0.109) (0.112)
lngdp 0.446∗∗ 0.403∗∗ 0.481
(0.142) (0.179) (0.216)
lnopen 0.329∗∗ 0.325∗∗ 0.0952∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.160) (0.0842)
polityIV 0.973 0.906
(0.0566) (0.0641)
landlocked 0.742 0.746
(0.562) (0.566)
island 0.754 0.235
(1.087) (0.426)
year 1.104∗∗
(0.0484)
N 178 178 151 130 125 125
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Basic results, including the geographical distance from France. Displaying odds ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
interv interv interv interv interv interv
fradist 0.819∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗ 0.711∗
(0.0701) (0.0693) (0.0808) (0.100) (0.121) (0.139)
intensity 3.058∗∗ 5.275∗∗∗ 4.735∗∗ 2.993∗ 6.722∗∗
(1.420) (2.869) (2.883) (1.937) (5.335)
lnpop 0.527∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.100) (0.110) (0.113)
lngdp 0.487∗∗ 0.433∗ 0.517
(0.150) (0.188) (0.226)
lnopen 0.332∗∗ 0.332∗∗ 0.0936∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.161) (0.0833)
polityIV 0.975 0.904
(0.0563) (0.0644)
landlocked 0.742 0.748
(0.560) (0.565)
island 0.734 0.218
(1.081) (0.401)
year 1.107∗∗
(0.0488)
N 178 178 151 130 125 125
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Basic results, including the geographical distance from China, Russia, and the US
(distances in 1,000km). Displaying odds ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
interv interv interv interv interv interv
intensity 2.705∗∗ 5.569∗∗ 2.605∗∗ 5.250∗∗ 2.611∗∗ 5.920∗∗
(1.232) (4.257) (1.177) (3.970) (1.181) (4.586)
chidist 1.073 0.988
(0.0532) (0.113)
rusdist 1.011 0.859
(0.0735) (0.140)
usdist 0.993 0.882
(0.0680) (0.113)
lnpop 0.303∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.107) (0.115)
lngdp 0.571 0.552 0.463
(0.244) (0.234) (0.229)
lnopen 0.122∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗
(0.0981) (0.0962) (0.101)
polityIV 0.911 0.911 0.912
(0.0618) (0.0624) (0.0618)
landlocked 0.759 0.664 0.830
(0.571) (0.499) (0.622)
island 0.0757 0.0886 0.106
(0.129) (0.154) (0.174)
year 1.110∗∗ 1.104∗∗ 1.109∗∗
(0.0469) (0.0459) (0.0468)
N 178 125 178 125 178 125
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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